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First-Time Adoption of IFRS, Managerial Incentives  
and Value-Relevance: Some French Evidence 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether and how managerial incentives influence the decision to 
elect optional exemptions when first adopting International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). It also examines the value-relevance of the mandatory and optional 
equity adjustments that must be recognized as a result of the first-time adoption of IFRS. 
Both questions are addressed in the context of the mandatory adoption of IFRS by French 
firms in 2005. Three major findings emerge from our analyses. First, managerial 
incentives influence the decision to strategically elect one or more optional exemptions at 
the transition date. Second, mandatory equity adjustments are more valued than French 
GAAP equity, suggesting that the first-time adoption of IFRS by French firms is 
perceived as a signal of an increase in the quality of their financial statements. Third, the 
value-relevance of optional IFRS equity adjustments depends on whether they result in 
the disclosure of new information.  
 
 
Keywords: Accounting choices, IFRS 1, mandatory equity adjustments, optional 
exemptions. 
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First-Time Adoption of IFRS, Managerial Incentives  
and Value-Relevance: Some French Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether and how managerial incentives influence the decision 
to elect optional exemptions when first adopting International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). It also examines the value-relevance of the mandatory and optional 
equity adjustments that must be recognized as a result of the first-time adoption of IFRS. 
Both questions are addressed in the context of the mandatory adoption of IFRS by French 
firms in 2005. Firms listed on European stock exchanges are required to use IFRS in their 
consolidated accounts since January 1, 2005 to comply with Regulation Act EC 
1606/2002.  The European Union (EU) Parliament mandated the adoption of IFRS to 
improve the integration of capital markets within Europe, and between Europe and the 
rest of the world. However, widespread adoption of IFRS also resulted in a fundamental 
change in European firms’ financial reporting since they previously followed a variety of 
country-specific generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that sometimes 
differed drastically from IFRS (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007).1  
Firms that adopt IFRS for the first time must comply with IFRS 1 – First-Time 
Adoption of IFRS. IFRS 1 generally requires first-time adopters to apply the version of 
IFRS effective at the reporting date retrospectively. Therefore, the first IFRS financial 
statements are presented as if the entity had always presented financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS. IFRS 1 contains mandatory exceptions to the general rule of 
retrospective application in areas where the effect of the change in accounting policies 
                                                 
1
 Prior to 2005, most European countries were reporting under a version of the 4th Directive incorporated in 
individual countries’ legislation. 
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cannot be measured with sufficient reliability. IFRS 1 also provides a number of optional 
exemptions to the general principle of retrospective application in areas where the costs 
of applying IFRS retrospectively may exceed the benefits to financial statement users, or 
where retrospective application may be impracticable. First-time adopters can elect to use 
one or more of these exemptions.  
We choose to focus on the first-time adoption of IFRS for two reasons. First, the 
cumulative effect of the mandatory and optional changes in accounting policies resulting 
from the first-time adoption of IFRS is charged to equity. Equity is used in the calculation 
of several key ratios such as return on equity, leverage, and price to book value. It is also 
a key determinant of firm value. As such, the choices made at the first-time adoption of 
IFRS can have significant financial and strategic implications. Second, the choices made 
at the first-time adoption of IFRS determine the accounting policies that will be used to 
prepare future IFRS financial statements. By electing to use one or more optional 
exemptions, managers can benefit from a fresh start by revaluing assets and liabilities. 
Furthermore, they establish the benchmark against which their performance will be 
assessed in the future.  
We study the first-time adoption of IFRS by French firms because French GAAP was 
shown to be among the most divergent from IFRS (Ding, Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy, 
2007). The implementation of IFRS in Europe, and in France in particular, introduces 
many changes in the traditional continental accounting practices. Hung and Subrananyam 
(2007) argue that “there is an urgent need for managers and investors to understand the 
implications of IAS adoption. This is especially true in European countries with 
stakeholder-oriented accounting systems (such as Germany and France), as IAS is 
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heavily influenced by the shareholder-oriented Anglo-Saxon accounting model, whereas 
local standards in many European countries have a greater contracting orientation and are 
driven by tax-book conformity considerations” (p. 624). Thus, the first-time adoption of 
IFRS is likely to have a significant impact on French firms’ financial statements. In 
addition, a survey published in 2005 by Mazars shows that French firms are the most 
likely in Europe (more than 60% compared to 40% for the rest of Europe) to believe that 
the adoption of IFRS increases the margin for interpretation.2 Hence, we expect reporting 
incentives to influence French firms’ decisions to elect one or more optional exemptions 
when first adopting IFRS. 
We classify sample firms based on their portfolio of exemption choices to examine 
whether and how managerial incentives influence the decision to elect optional 
exemptions when first adopting IFRS. Our analysis of the information disclosed in the 
annual reports on the impact of the optional exemption choices on equity leads us to 
distinguish between firms that only choose exemptions with a negative impact on equity 
and other firms. We expect firms that report equity-increasing mandatory adjustments 
and firms with higher book values and higher earnings multiples to be more likely to elect 
optional exemptions that have a negative impact on equity at transition date, and firms 
with higher leverage to be less likely to elect such exemptions. Our results are consistent 
with our expectations. We also find that French firms cross-listed on a non-European 
stock exchange are less likely to elect optional exemptions with a negative impact on 
                                                 
2
 The survey was conducted in 2005 on 556 European firms from twelve countries. It shows the firms were 
technically ready to adopt IFRS, even though they were not convinced IFRS would improve the 
comparability and transparency of financial statements. The survey shows that French firms were less 
prepared than their counterparts in other European countries. It also demonstrates they were the most 
sceptical about IFRS: 25% of French firms vs. 50% of firms from other countries believed IFRS would 
improve the transparency of financial statements; 37% of French firms vs. 63% of firms from other 
countries believed IFRS would improve the comparability of financial statements from different countries. 
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equity at the transition date, but that larger firms are more likely to choose such 
exemptions. 
To test for the value-relevance of the mandatory and optional equity adjustments that 
must be recognized as a result of the first-time adoption of IFRS, we alter our basic 
valuation model to separate the cumulative effect of all mandatory adjustments and the 
individual effect of each optional exemption from the book value of equity. Consistent 
with prior research, we expect the first-time adoption of IFRS by French firms to be 
perceived as a signal of an increase in the quality of their financial statements. As such, 
we expect mandatory and optional IFRS equity adjustments to be more valued than 
French GAAP equity. Furthermore, we expect the value-relevance of optional IFRS 
equity adjustments to be influenced by whether they result in the disclosure of new 
information regarding capital assets, employee benefits, cumulative translation 
differences, financial assets, and business combinations. Consistent with our expectation, 
results show that mandatory IFRS adjustments are more valued than French GAAP 
equity and that optional equity adjustments that result in the disclosure of new 
information are generally valued.  
Our study contributes to the accounting literature in at least three ways. We contribute 
to the literature on the determinants of mandatory accounting changes by studying factors 
affecting the decision to simultaneously elect up to five optional exemptions when first 
adopting a new set of GAAP, IFRS, rather than focusing on individual changes within a 
specific set of accounting standards. We contribute to the literature related to the 
determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption by examining the causes and 
consequences of the individual exemption choices made at the transition date, rather than 
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considering the adoption per se as the choice. Finally, we contribute to the literature on 
the valuation effects of mandatory IFRS adoption by investigating the value relevance of 
equity adjustments at the transition date rather than focusing on the value relevance of 
earnings and equity as reported in the first IFRS financial statements. We also distinguish 
between mandatory and optional equity adjustments.  
Standard setters and regulators are interested in understanding managers’ reporting 
choices to determine how the discretion afforded by accounting standards may be 
exploited. The EU Parliament mandated the adoption of IFRS by all European listed 
firms to enhance the comparability, consistency and transparency of their financial 
statements. One of the stated objectives of IFRS 1 is to ensure that the information 
provided in the first IFRS financial statements is transparent for users and consistent with 
all prior years. By showing that optional exemption choices are associated with 
managerial incentives and that the potential for managerial opportunism seems to reduce 
the perceived reliability and value-relevance of optional equity adjustments, our results 
provide insight into the potential costs and benefits of the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
and IFRS 1. They indicate that the EU Parliament and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) have not been entirely successful in enforcing increased 
transparency. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the first-time adoption of IFRS and reviews the related literature. Section 
3 presents the research hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the methodology. Section 5 
presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications of the 
study. 
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2. Background 
2.1 First-Time Adoption of IFRS  
IFRS 1 – First-Time Adoption of IFRS specifies the requirements that an entity must 
follow when it first adopts IFRS as the basis for preparing its general-purpose financial 
statements. The IASB issued IFRS 1 in June 2003, superseding SIC 8 – First-Time 
Application of IAS as the Primary Basis of Accounting. The standard is effective for 
first-time IFRS financial statements for periods beginning on or after January 1, 2004. 
The objectives of IFRS 1 are to ease the transition to IFRS globally and to create 
comparability over time for an individual entity and between different entities adopting 
IFRS for the first time at a given date (Deloitte, 2004).  
An entity’s first-time IFRS financial statements are the first annual financial 
statements in which it states compliance with IFRS in an explicit and unreserved 
statement. IFRS 1 generally requires first-time adopters to apply the version of IFRS 
effective at the reporting date (i.e. the balance sheet date) retrospectively. The specific 
transitional provisions of the individual standards do not apply to first-time adopters.  
A first-time adopter is required to prepare an opening balance sheet in accordance 
with IFRS 1 at the date of transition. This opening IFRS balance sheet serves as the 
starting point for the entity’s accounting under IFRS (Epstein, 2006). The same 
accounting policies must be applied in the opening IFRS balance sheet and all periods 
presented in the first IFRS financial statements. The date of transition to IFRS is defined 
as “the beginning of the earliest period for which an entity presents full comparative 
information under IFRS in its first IFRS financial statements” (IASC, 2003). IFRS 1 
requires first-time adopters to present at least one year of comparative financial statement 
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information. The EU Parliament has the same requirement. Therefore, French (and other 
European) firms first adopting IFRS in 2005 for calendar year financial statements report 
in accordance with the following timetable:  
• January 1, 2004 – Transition date 
• December 31, 2004 – French GAAP financial statements 
• December 31, 2005 – First IFRS financial statements with comparative IFRS 
information 
According to Sections 13 to 25 of IFRS 1, first-time adopters should apply four rules 
when preparing the opening IFRS balance sheet: 1) recognize all assets and liabilities 
whose recognition is required under IFRS; 2) derecognize items as assets or liabilities if 
IFRS does not permit such recognition; 3) reclassify items recognized under previous 
GAAP as one type of asset, liability or component of equity as a different type of asset, 
liability or component of equity under IFRS; and 4) measure all recognized assets and 
liabilities according to principles set forth in IFRS. If the transition to IFRS results in a 
change in accounting policies, the effect of the change is recognized directly in equity in 
the IFRS opening balance sheet. 
Sections 26 to 34 of IFRS 1 contain four mandatory exceptions to the general rule of 
retrospective application in areas where the effect of the change in accounting policies 
cannot be measured with sufficient reliability (e.g. retrospective application would 
require judgments by management about past conditions after the outcome of a particular 
transaction is already known). IFRS 1 also provides a number of optional exemptions to 
the general principle of retrospective application in areas where the costs of applying 
IFRS retrospectively may exceed the benefits to financial statement users, or where 
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retrospective application may be impracticable. First-time adopters can elect to use one or 
more exemptions.  
2.2 Optional Exemptions  
The set of standards to be applied by first-time adopters in 2005, also called the stable 
platform, provides for ten optional exemptions to the general principle of retrospective 
application.3 First-time adopters’ ability to use one or more exemptions first depends on 
the differences between IFRS and the predecessor national GAAP. 4 The most significant 
differences between French GAAP and IFRS follow. First, the recognition of defined 
benefit plans is optional. Second, the temporal method is used to translate the financial 
statements of integrated foreign operations. Third, financial assets are valued at the lower 
of cost or market. Fourth, business combinations can be accounted for using either the 
pooling or the purchase method.5 In addition, firms that did not revalue their capital 
assets under French GAAP can choose to revalue their capital assets upwards. We focus 
on the five optional exemptions that relate to these differences and choices. 
2.2.1 Fair Value or Revaluation as Deemed Cost 
IAS 16 – Property, Plant and Equipment allows firms to choose between the cost 
model and the revaluation model for the measurement of their capital assets after 
                                                 
3
 The exemptions are: 1) business combinations; 2) fair value or revaluation as deemed cost; 3) employee 
benefits; 4) cumulative translation differences; 5) compound financial instruments; 6) assets and liabilities 
of subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures; 7) designation of previously recognized financial instruments; 
8) share-based payment transactions; 9) insurance contracts; and 10) decommissioning liabilities included 
in the cost of property, plant and equipment.   
4
 Readers interested in knowing more about French accounting can refer to Chapter 5 of Walton, Haller and 
Raffournier (2003).  
5
 French GAAP also do not require the recognition of share-based payment transactions. However, whether 
or not French firms use the optional exemption offered by IFRS 1 has no impact on equity at the transition 
date because the decrease in retained earnings coming from the recognition of the compensation expense is 
offset by the increase in the stock options equity account. The use of the optional exemption also has no 
impact on future net income because the options to which it applies have already vested. Thus, we do not 
consider this exemption. 
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recognition. IFRS 1 allows first-time adopters to measure capital assets at fair value at the 
date of transition to IFRS and to use that fair value as its deemed cost at that date. 
Revaluations are credited to equity and amortized with the asset. First-time adopters that 
revalued one or more categories of capital assets under previous GAAP (such as French 
GAAP) are allowed to use these values as deemed cost at the transition date.6 First-time 
adopters that choose to use the exemption do not have to use the revaluation model in 
future periods. The revaluation typically increases transition date equity and reduces 
future net income.  
2.2.2 Employee Benefits 
IAS 19 – Employee Benefits requires firms to measure the compensation cost 
associated with employees’ benefits and to recognize that cost over the employees’ 
respective service periods (Epstein, 2006). Cumulative actuarial gains and losses are 
recognized in accordance with the corridor approach. IFRS 1 allows firms to calculate the 
net pension obligation7 at the transition date without consideration of the corridor 
approach, and to eliminate unrecognized actuarial gains and losses by charging them to 
equity in the opening IFRS balance sheet. By so doing, first-time adopters avoid having 
to amortize these gains and losses to future net income. This is especially beneficial to 
firms with actuarial losses because they avoid future decreases in net income by 
eliminating the need to amortize the unrecognized losses in excess of the corridor. 
2.2.3 Cumulative Translation Differences 
IAS 21 – The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates prescribes the use of the 
current rate method to translate the financial statements of foreign subsidiaries. IFRS 1 
                                                 
6
 However, they are rarely practiced. 
7
 Present value of pension obligation minus fair value of pension plan assets. 
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allows first-time adopters to calculate the cumulative translation difference prospectively 
instead of retrospectively and to set the cumulative translation difference calculated in 
accordance with previous GAAP to zero. Only translation differences that arose after the 
date of transition to IFRS will be recognized in future net income if the foreign operation 
is subsequently sold. Again, this is especially beneficial to firms with cumulative 
translation losses because they can avoid future decreases in net income by electing to 
use the optional exemption. 
2.2.4 Designation of Previously Recognized Financial Instruments 
IAS 39 – Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement requires firms to 
designate financial assets as “at fair value through profit or loss” or as “available-for-
sale” when they are initially recognized. IFRS 1 allows first-time adopters to designate 
previously recognized financial assets as “as at fair value through profit or loss” or as 
“available-for-sale” at the transition date. For instruments previously carried at the lower 
of cost or market, the revaluation increases equity at the transition date. It also decreases 
future net income because a portion of the unrealized gain on the financial asset has 
recognized directly in equity at the transition date.  
2.2.5 Business Combinations 
IFRS 3 – Business Combinations requires the use of the purchase method for all 
business combinations. Retrospective application of IFRS 3 may be difficult, if not 
impossible, for past business combinations. Thus, IFRS 1 allows first-time adopters to  
account for a business combination prior to the transition date in accordance with 
previously followed GAAP rather than with IFRS 3. First-time adopters that elect to 
account for past business combinations in accordance with IFRS 1 do not have to 
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reclassify them (i.e. pooling of interests method can be maintained); they do not have to 
remeasure original fair values determined at the time of the business combination; and 
they do not have to adjust the carrying amount of goodwill recognized under previous 
GAAP.8 Firms that choose to apply IFRS 3 retrospectively need to restate goodwill at the 
amount before any amortization. The impact of the change in accounting policy on equity 
at the transition date is therefore likely to be positive. Furthermore, future net income is 
likely to increase in all cases because goodwill will not be amortized after the transition 
date. Table 1 summarizes the optional exemptions. 
{Insert Table 1 here} 
2.3 Relationship to Prior Research 
A large number of empirical studies investigate the determinants and consequences of 
voluntary adoption of IFRS. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply the evidence from 
voluntary adoption of IFRS to its mandatory adoption for two reasons. First, voluntary 
adopters are unlikely to suffer negative net consequences from the adoption of IFRS 
because they have the choice to keep using local GAAP if the costs of IFRS reporting 
exceed the benefits. Second, the adoption can only be seen as a potential signal to the 
market if it results from a choice (i.e. not all firms have to comply with IFRS) (Daske, 
Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008). Therefore, we focus on studies that examine the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. Because these studies are typically in working paper format, their 
findings should be viewed as preliminary (Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008). 
                                                 
8
 First-time adopters that choose to apply IFRS 3 retroactively must have obtained the information 
necessary to apply IFRS 3 at the date of the business combination. They must apply IFRS 3 to all business 
combinations subsequent to the date of the earliest business combination accounted for in accordance with 
IFRS 3 and earlier than the transition date.  
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2.3.1 Earnings Management and Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
A first group of studies examine accounting quality changes in connection with 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Capkun, Cazavan-Jeny, Jeanjean and Weiss (2008) investigate 
whether European firms use the discretion afforded by IFRS to manage earnings during 
the mandatory transition to IFRS. Their sample includes 1,722 firms from European 
countries where adoption of IFRS was mandatory in 2005. They test for the presence of 
earnings management and find that managers use the transition period to increase their 
reported earnings and return on assets (ROA), and to avoid reporting losses. Earnings 
management in the transition period is present in all countries, with the highest levels in 
Poland, France and Italy.  
Christensen, Lee and Walker (2008) examine changes in earnings management and 
timely loss recognition during IFRS adoption for a sample of German firms, focusing on 
earnings smoothing and managing towards small positive earnings. The authors compare 
German firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS before 2005 (the voluntary adopters) to 
German firms that are forced to comply as of 2005 (the resisters). This allows them to test 
whether accounting quality improves when firms are forced to comply with what is 
generally perceived as higher quality accounting standards. Consistent with prior 
literature, they find that voluntary adoption of IFRS is associated with decreased earnings 
management and more timely loss recognition. However, they find no evidence of 
accounting quality improvements for firms that are forced to adopt IFRS. This leads them 
to conclude that the adoption of IFRS does not necessarily lead to higher quality 
accounting and that the flexibility offered by IFRS might render it ineffective in 
restricting earnings management.  
14 
 
Thus, the evidence to date suggests the presence of earnings management during the 
mandatory transition to IFRS. However, it does not provide insights into the accounting 
choices used to manage earnings, or the reporting incentives that drive such choices. As 
such, our study contributes to this stream of literature in at least three ways. First, we 
focus on a specific set of accounting choices, the portfolio of optional exemptions chosen 
by French firms, and their impact on equity rather than looking at the overall impact of 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS on ROA or earnings. It is important to look at the impact 
of the choices made on equity because IFRS 1 requires the effect of the changes in 
accounting policies resulting from the mandatory adoption of IFRS to be charged to 
equity, not earnings. Second, we identify reporting incentives likely to affect the portfolio 
of optional exemptions chosen by French firms rather than only testing for the presence 
of earnings management. Finally, we consider the impact of the optional exemptions 
chosen by French firms on both transition-date equity and future earnings rather than only 
looking at the current impact on earnings. It is important to do so because managers are 
not likely to ignore the impact on future earnings of the choices made when first adopting 
IFRS. 
2.3.2 Value-Relevance and Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
A second group of studies uses the first set of financial statements released by 
European firms under IFRS to examine the valuation effects of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Horton and Serafeim (2007) examine the value relevance of the earnings and 
equity IFRS adjustments for a sample of UK first-time adopters. Their results indicate 
that the earnings reconciliation adjustment is value relevant and has incremental price 
relevance over and above the UK GAAP numbers. In contrast, the equity adjustment does 
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not seem to be value relevant. The authors attribute this result to the fact that IFRS and 
UK earnings are very different and highly variable, whereas IFRS and UK equity appear 
to be very similar.  
Capkun, Cazavan-Jeny, Jeanjean and Weiss (2008) examine the value-relevance of 
earnings and book values under local GAAP and IFRS for a sample of 1,528 first-time 
adopters across Europe. They decompose earnings and the book value of equity under 
IFRS into earnings and the book value of equity under local GAAP and the IFRS 
earnings and equity adjustments. They conduct the valuation analysis using market value 
four months after the transition date and and then repeat the analysis with market value 
four months after the 2005 fiscal year-end. Similar to Horton and Serafeim (2007), their 
results indicate that the earnings reconciliation adjustment is value relevant and has 
incremental price relevance over and above local GAAP. While the book value of equity 
under local GAAP is value-relevant, the equity reconciliation adjustments do not seem to 
be. The authors do not offer any potential explanation for this result. However, 
descriptive statistics indicate that earnings under local GAAP and IFRS are very different 
whereas local GAAP and IFRS equity appear to be quite similar.  
The effect of any change in accounting policies from the first-time adoption of IFRS 
has to be recognized directly in equity at transition date. Thus, we investigate the value 
relevance of equity adjustments at transition date rather than focusing on the value 
relevance of earnings and equity as reported in the first IFRS financial statements. We 
also distinguish between mandatory and optional equity adjustments. Overall, we expect 
this unique approach will help us to better assess the valuation consequences of first-time 
adoption per se. 
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3. Hypotheses Development  
3.1 Determinants of Optional Exemptions 
French firms have the opportunity to exercise discretion when first applying IFRS 
because 1) IFRS 1 offers optional exemptions to the general principle of retrospective 
application; and 2) they can elect to use one or more exemptions. Given this opportunity, 
we consider three incentives for French firms to strategically elect one or more optional 
exemptions. 
3.1.1 Offsetting Mandatory Adjustments 
 Optional exemptions can provide an opportunity for French firms to mitigate the 
impact of the mandatory equity adjustments that need to be recognized because of the 
first-time adoption of IFRS. The mandatory adoption of IFRS in France and the rest of 
Europe is often referred to as an accounting revolution (e.g. KPMG, 2006). However, 
Marchal, Boukari and Cayssials (2007) show that the absolute effect of the first-time 
adoption of IFRS on equity is less than 5% for 45% of listed French firms. Similarly, 
Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2007) find an average decrease in equity at transition date of 
only 3.5%. Both papers attribute the relatively small net impact on equity to the offsetting 
of equity-increasing and equity-decreasing changes in accounting policies as a result of 
the first-time adoption of IFRS. Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2007) further show that the 
impact on equity at the transition date of the optional exemptions that French firms 
choose to apply tends to be positive (negative) when the mandatory adjustments have a 
negative (positive) effect. This suggests that the observed offsetting of equity-increasing 
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and equity-decreasing changes in accounting policies is partly attributable to the strategic 
use of the optional exemptions9. Hence, our first research hypothesis:  
H1:  Firms are likely to choose optional exemptions that have a net negative (positive) 
impact on equity at the transition date to offset the positive (negative) net impact 
of mandatory adjustments. 
3.1.2 Trade-Off between Current Impact on Equity and Future Impact on Net 
Income 
Most optional exemption choices made at the transition date will have an opposite 
impact on future net income. French firms must therefore consider the impact of optional 
exemptions on equity at transition date and future net income when first adopting IFRS.10 
According to Karleff (2003), the retroactive method has the potential to mute the impact 
of and attention paid to negative events because they are buried in the past and do not 
appear on the income statement. Hence, there is a perceived benefit to reporting negative 
events directly in equity. Optional exemptions with a negative impact on equity may also 
lead to an increase in future net income. A higher earnings multiple can provide an 
incentive for French firms to strategically elect these exemptions since they would then 
                                                 
9
 It is important to test H1 to answer our research question even though Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean have 
already investigated this effect because offsetting the effect of mandatory adjustments is likely to be one of 
the most significant reporting incentives when it comes to the optional exemptions offered by IFRS 1. 
Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean’s analysis is mostly univariate. They also test H1 by regressing the impact of 
mandatory adjustments to equity on the impact of the optional exemptions on equity, thereby treating each 
optional exemption as an individual choice.  In contrast, we classify sample firms based on their portfolio 
of exemption choices. Our paper also provides a more extensive examination of the first-time adoption of 
IFRS by French firms as it considers both the causes and consequences of such adoption.  
10
 Beatty and Weber (2006) examine SFAS 142 adoption decisions, focusing on the trade-off between 
recording certain current goodwill impairment charges below the line and uncertain future impairment 
charges included in income from continuing operations. They show that firms whose future above-the-line 
goodwill impairment losses are expected to be more highly capitalized by the market are more likely to 
record adoption write-offs, and record relatively larger charges when adopting SFAS 142. As such, their 
evidence suggests that firms also consider the impact of their accounting choices on future periods when 
making those choices.  
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also benefit from an increase in future share price. Hence, our second research 
hypothesis:  
H2:  Firms with higher book values and higher earnings multiples are more likely to 
elect optional exemptions that have a net negative impact on equity at the  
transition date. 
3.1.3 Leverage 
Debt financing generates incentives for the exercise of accounting discretion 
because lenders extensively rely on financial statements for the evaluation of a firm’s 
financial standing and credit rating, and set debt covenants that need to be met to avoid 
debt contract violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Thus, firms that need the 
continuous support of their lenders are more likely to make accounting choices that 
enhance their profitability and reduce their leverage (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
Marchal, Boukari and Cayssials (2007) show that the first-time adoption of IFRS 
increases leverage by more than 10% for 45% of surveyed French firms, and by more 
than 20% for 28% of these same firms. Mandatory adjustments such as the recognition of 
variable interest entities and the revaluation of hedged liabilities are the most significant 
sources of increases in leverage at the transition date. This can create an incentive for 
firms with higher leverage to choose not to implement optional exemptions that have a 
net negative impact on equity at the transition date to avoid further increases in leverage. 
As such, our third research hypothesis:      
H3:  Firms with higher leverage are less likely to elect optional exemptions that have a 
net negative impact on equity at the transition date. 
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3.2 Valuation of IFRS Adjustments 
It is generally believed that investors tend to place little importance on catch-up 
adjustments to reflect the cumulative effect of using an accounting policy for the first 
time (Ciesielski, 2004). Further, the retroactive method has the potential to mute the 
impact and attention paid to negative events because they are buried in the past and do 
not appear on the income statement (Karleff, 2003).  In addition, frequent restatements 
may cause public concern over the reliability of financial statements (Eldridge, 2004). At 
the same time, prior research suggests that the adoption of IFRS, be it voluntary or 
mandatory, is perceived as a signal of an increase in the quality of accounting 
information, thereby increasing its association with stock prices and stock returns (e.g. 
Morais and Curto, 2007; Bellas, Toludas and Papadatos, 2007; Barth, Landsman and 
Lang, 2008).  
Consistent with prior research, we expect the first-time adoption of IFRS by 
French firms to be perceived as a signal of an increase in the quality of the financial 
statements. As such, we expect mandatory and optional IFRS equity adjustments to be 
valued more than French GAAP equity. However, the value-relevance of optional IFRS 
equity adjustments is likely to be influenced by whether they result in the disclosure of 
new information regarding capital assets, employee benefits, cumulative translation 
differences, financial assets, and business combinations. Thus, we expect the option to set 
cumulative translation differences to zero not to be valued since this decision only leads 
to the reclassification of an amount already known to retained earnings. Hence, our fourth 
and fifth research hypotheses: 
H4:  Mandatory IFRS equity adjustments are valued more than French GAAP equity. 
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H5a:  Revaluations as deemed cost are valued. 
H5b:  Cumulative actuarial gains or losses are valued.  
H5c:  Cumulative translation differences are not valued. 
H5d:  Revaluations of financial assets are valued. 
H5e: Retrospective application of IFRS 3 is valued. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Sample and Data 
The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 2. Sample firms were 
drawn from the Société des Bourses Françaises Index (SBF 120) as at December 31, 
2005. To enter the sample, firms must be first-time adopters of IFRS in their 2005 
financial statements. Three firms were excluded because they are reporting in US GAAP. 
Three firms were excluded because they were already using IFRS before 2005 (i.e. they 
are not first-time adopters). Finally, seven firms were excluded because they have been 
delisted. This results in a sample of 107 firms. Financial data was obtained from 
Worldscope. Information on the optional exemption choices was hand collected from the 
annual reports.  One firm was lost because of missing data, for a final sample of 106 
firms. The final sample represents 67% of the French stock market capitalization at the 
end of 2005.  
{Insert Table 2 here} 
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4.2  Models and Variables 
4.2.1 Determinants of Optional Exemptions 
The following probit regression model is used to examine the determinants of 
French firms’ decisions to use one or more optional exemptions when first adopting 
IFRS: 
OPTEXEMPi = β0 + β1MANDADJUSTi + β2TRADEOFFi + β3LEVERAGEi + β4FLISTi + 
β5SIZEi + εi          (1) 
Where: 
OPTEXEMP = 1 if the firm elects to use only the optional exemptions with a 
negative impact on equity at the transition date; 0 otherwise 
MANDADJUST = 1 if the sum of the mandatory equity adjustments at the 
transition date is positive; 0 otherwise 
TRADEOFF = 1 if the firm’s equity before optional exemptions and earnings 
multiple are higher than the sample median; 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE = Long-term debt under French GAAP at the end of 2004 divided 
by total assets under French GAAP at the end of 2004 
FLIST = 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a non-European stock exchange; 0 
otherwise 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of lagged total assets 
 
We code the impact of each of the five optional exemptions on equity at the 
transition date to develop our dependent variable. Three variables are included in the 
model to proxy for incentives to strategically elect one or more optional exemptions 
(MANDADJUST, TRADEOFF, LEVERAGE). MANDADJUST differentiates between 
firms with net positive and net negative mandatory adjustments. If firms use the optional 
exemptions to offset the impact of mandatory adjustments, then MANDADJUST will be 
positively related to OPTEXEMP.  TRADEOFF distinguishes between firms with equity 
before IFRS adjustments higher than the sample median and an earnings multiple higher 
than the sample median, and others. The earnings multiple is derived from the Capital 
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Asset Pricing Model. We calculate the expected return using the risk free rate of the 
European Central Bank for 2005 (3%) and the return on the SBF 120 for that same year. 
The earnings multiple is calculated as 1 over the expected return. Consistent with H2, we 
expect TRADEOFF to be positively related to OPTEXEMP.  LEVERAGE is calculated 
using French GAAP data to exclude the impact of the optional exemptions. If firms with 
higher leverage avoid optional exemptions with a negative impact on equity to prevent 
further increases in leverage, then LEVERAGE will be negatively related to OPTEXEMP.  
Finally, two control variables are included in the model (FLIST, SIZE).  French 
firms that list on foreign stock exchanges increase their reliance on international investors 
for financing and valuation. Foreign listing also results in increased analyst following and 
monitoring of managers’ accounting decisions. As such, it could influence their choice of 
optional exemptions.  In the context of positive accounting theory, firm size is posited to 
proxy for political costs faced by a firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). A consistent 
result across many positive accounting studies is the influence of size in the 
determination of a firm’s accounting policies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Again, this 
suggests that firm size could influence French firms’ choices of optional exemptions. 
However, we do not make any directional prediction for FLIST and SIZE. 11 
4.2.2 Valuation of IFRS Adjustments 
The following ordinary least squares regression model is used to examine the value-
relevance of IFRS adjustments for French firms that adopt IFRS for the first time: 
                                                 
11Executive compensation could be considered a potential incentive for French firms to strategically elect 
one or more exemptions. When we add CEO compensation (salary + bonus) as an independent variable in 
the determinants model, the coefficient is not significant and our other results remain unchanged.  
 
23 
 
MTBi = β0 + β1INEQUITYi + β2ADJBVi + β3MANDIFRSi + β4REVALi + β5EBENi + 
β6TRANSDIFFi + β7FININSTRi + β8BUSCOMREMi + β9RESEPSi + εi  (2) 
Where: 
MTB = Closing share price three months after the end of the adoption 
year divided by book value of equity per share the end of t-1  
INEQUITY = 1/ book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
ADJBV = Book value per share minus the cumulative effect of the 
mandatory and optional IFRS adjustments per share divided by 
book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
MANDIFRS = Cumulative effect of the mandatory IFRS adjustments per share 
divided by book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
REVAL = Effect of revaluation as deemed cost exemption per share 
divided by book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
EBEN = Effect of employee benefits exemption per share divided by 
book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
TRANSDIFF = Effect of cumulative translation difference exemption per share 
divided by book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
FININSTR = Effect of designation of previously recognized financial 
instruments exemption per share divided by book value of 
equity per share at the end of t-1 
BUSCOMREM = Effect of retrospective application of IFRS 3 per share divided 
by book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
RESEPS = Residual earnings per share for the adoption year divided by 
book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
 
Our model is based on Amir and Lev (1996) and Collins, Pincus and Xie (1999). 
However, previous research by Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999) argues that there is a problem 
with an omitted correlated variable, the scale factor, in this model. Therefore, similar to 
Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) and Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), we scale all 
variables by book value per share at the end of t-1. We calculate Cook’s D statistic and 
exclude all observations with D > 1. The regression is then re-estimated with the 
coefficient tests being based on White’s t-statistics. This approach is similar to Aboody, 
Barth and Kasznik (2004). The valuation model is altered to separate the cumulative 
effect of mandatory adjustments and the individual effect of each optional exemption 
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from the book value of equity. Thus, ADJBV captures the book value of equity under 
French GAAP. Consistent with prior research, we expect ADJBV to be positively related 
to share price. We also expect mandatory IFRS adjustments (MANDIFRS) to be 
positively related to share price. We use a test of equality of coefficients to test for H4. 
Consistent with H5a, H5b and H5d, we expect REVAL, EBEN and FININSTR to be 
positively related to share price. Consistent with H5c, we expect the coefficient on 
TRANSDIFF not to be significantly related to share price. Finally, consistent with prior 
research, we expect RESEPS to be positively associated with share price. Residual 
earnings per share are calculated using a fixed cost of capital of 9% (the risk-free rate of 
the European Central Bank for 2005 (3%) plus a risk premium of 6%) for all sample 
firms. This approach is similar to the one used by Bernard (1995) and Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000).  
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 summarizes the classification procedure used to code the dependent 
variable in Model 1. Our analysis of the disclosures related to the impact of the optional 
exemptions in the annual report reveals that: 1) 21 firms revalued their capital assets 
upwards; 2) 80 firms charged unrecognized actuarial losses to equity; 3) 83 firms 
transfered cumulative translation losses to retained earnings; 4) 50 firms revalued their 
financial assets upwards; and 5) 7 firms applied IFRS 3 retrospectively to all their 
business combinations. None of our sample firms revalued their capital assets or financial 
assets downwards, or reported unrecognized actuarial gains. Only 4 firms showed 
cumulative translation gains.  
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Based on these statistics, we consider that two of the optional exemptions have a 
negative impact on equity (employee benefits and cumulative translation differences) and 
three have a positive impact on equity (fair value or revaluation as deemed cost, the 
designation of previously recognized financial instruments, and business combinations). 
We then classify sample firms based on their portfolio of exemption choices. We 
distinguish between firms that choose only exemptions with a negative impact on equity 
(42 firms), and others (64 firms).  Our dependent variable is coded accordingly.  
Among the 42 firms that only chose optional exemptions with a negative impact on 
equity, 4 firms only chose to use the exemption related to employee benefits, 10 firms 
only chose to use the exemption related to cumulative translation differences and 28 firms 
chose to use both exemptions. Among the 64 other firms, 8 firms chose to revalue their 
capital assets upwards, 36 firms chose to designate previously recognized financial 
instruments and 2 firms chose to apply IFRS 3 retrospectively. Five firms chose to both 
designate previously recognized financial instruments and apply IFRS 3 retrospectively. 
Finally, 13 firms chose to both revalue their capital assets upwards and designate 
previously recognized financial instruments.  
{Insert Table 3 here} 
Table 4 presents mean and median values for the variables included in the 
regression models for firms that elect optional exemptions with a negative impact on 
equity at transition date (N = 42), other firms (N = 64) and all sample firms (N = 106). 
We use tests of differences in means and medians to compare the behaviour of the two 
groups and provide univariate evidence to support our research hypotheses. Consistent 
with H1, a higher proportion of firms that elected optional exemptions with a negative 
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impact on equity at the transition date report mandatory equity adjustments with a 
positive impact on equity, and the difference in means is significant (p < 0.077). 
Consistent with H2, a higher proportion of firms that chose optional exemptions with a 
negative impact on equity at transition date have higher than median book values and 
earnings multiples, and the differences in means and medians are significant (p < 0.012 
and p < 0.020). Finally, consistent with H3, firms that elect for optional exemptions with a 
negative impact on equity at the transition date have lower leverage and the difference in 
means is significant (p < 0.021).  
Firms that elect exemptions with a negative impact on equity at the transition date 
report higher cumulative translation losses on average (p < 0.014), but lower revaluations 
of capital assets (p < 0.056 and p < 0.018) and financial assets (p < 0.173 and p < 0.002), 
a finding that is consistent with the criteria used to classify sample firms in the first place. 
They are less likely to be cross-listed on a non-European stock exchange (p < 0.002 and p 
< 0.003), are larger (p < 0.025), have a lower share price (p < 0.040 and p < 0.017), report 
higher equity under French GAAP (p < 0.006 and p < 0.011), and are more profitable (p 
< 0.050).    
The net impact of the first-time adoption of IFRS on equity at the transition date is 
relatively small on average (€0.46 per share as compared to equity under French GAAP 
of €24.46 per share) (untabulated). This suggests that the effect of mandatory IFRS equity 
adjustments is offset by the use of optional exemptions, a finding that is consistent with 
the results of Marchal, Boukari and Cayssials (2007) and Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean 
(2007). It also provides univariate support for H1.     
{Insert Table 4 here} 
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Table 5 presents Pearson correlations between the variables included in the 
regression models. In Panel A, it can be observed that OPTEXEMP is positively 
correlated with TRADEOFF (ρ = 0.219) and negatively correlated with LEVERAGE (ρ = 
-0.203). The latter results are consistent with H2 and H3. OPTEXEMP is also negatively 
correlated with FLIST (ρ = -0.286). In Panel B, none of the correlations between PRICE, 
REVAL, EBEN, TRANSDIFF, FINISTR and BUSCOMREM is significant. Overall, 
however, the univariate evidence is largely consistent with our predictions. 
{Insert Table 5 here} 
4.2 Determinants of Optional Exemptions 
Table 6 presents the result of the binary probit regression examining the 
determinants of French firms’ decisions to elect one or more optional exemptions when 
first adopting IFRS.  The model is significant (p < 0.000) with a pseudo R2 of 26.8%.  
Consistent with H1, the coefficient on MANDADJUST is positive and significant (0.782; 
p < 0.05). This suggests that French firms use optional exemptions to offset the impact of 
mandatory IFRS equity adjustments on equity at transition date. The coefficient on 
TRADEOFF is also positive and significant (0.701; p < 0.01). Consistent with H2, this 
indicates that firms with higher book values and higher earnings multiples are more likely 
to elect optional exemptions that have a negative impact on equity at the transition date. 
Thus, French firms seem to consider the impact of optional exemptions on equity at the 
transition date and future net income when first adopting IFRS. Consistent with H3, the 
coefficient on LEVERAGE is negative and significant (-3.518; p < 0.01). This shows that 
firms with higher leverage are less likely to elect optional exemptions with a negative 
impact on equity at the transition date, potentially to avoid further increases in leverage 
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from the first-time adoption of IFRS. The coefficient on FLIST is negative and significant 
(-1.932; p < 0.01), suggesting that French firms cross-listed on a non-European stock 
exchange are less likely to elect optional exemptions with a negative impact on equity at 
the transition date. Finally, the coefficient on SIZE is positive and significant (0.315; p < 
0.01). This indicates that larger firms are more likely to choose optional exemptions with 
a negative impact on equity at the transition date.  
{Insert Table 6 here} 
4.3 Valuation of IFRS Adjustments 
Table 7 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression examining the 
value-relevance of IFRS equity adjustments for French firms that adopt IFRS for the first 
time. The model is significant (p < 0.000) with an R2 of 47.8%. Consistent with our 
expectations, ADJBV (1.587; p < 0.01) and RESEPS (11.092; p < 0.01) are positively 
associated with share price, and the associations are significant. Mandatory IFRS 
adjustments per share (MANDIFRS) are also positively associated with share price and 
the association is significant (1.745; p < 0.01). Consistent with H4, the test of equality of 
coefficients between ADJBV and MANDIFRS is not significant (ADJBV – MANDIFRS = 
0; F = 0.95; p < 0.33). This suggests that mandatory IFRS adjustments per share contain 
significantly more information content than French GAAP equity, and that the first-time 
adoption of IFRS by French firms is perceived as a signal of an increase in the quality of 
the financial statements.  
 Consistent with H5a, REVAL is positive and marginally significant (1.575; p < 
0.10). This indicates that investors incorporate the new information on the fair value of 
capital assets into their valuation assessments. Consistent with H5b, EBEN is positive and 
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significant (2.244; p < 0.01). This indicates that investors incorporate the new 
information on the value of the net pension obligation into their valuation assessments 
(i.e. actuarial gains valued positively and actuarial losses valued negatively). Consistent 
with H5e, BUSCOMREM is positive and significant (2.731; p < 0.01). This indicates that 
investors incorporate the new information on prior business combinations into their 
valuation assessments. Contrary to our expectation, FININSTR is negative and not 
significant (-23.761; p> 0.10). Nevertheless, our evidence suggests that investors do not 
question the reliability of the measurement of the fair value of capital assets, the pension 
obligation, and the new information on prior business combinations, perhaps as a 
reflection of the fact that they are based on expert reports. Finally, H5c is supported as 
TRANSDIFF is negative but not significant (-1.422; p > 0.10). The decision to reset 
cumulative translation losses to zero does not have any impact on equity. It only leads to 
the reclassification of an amount already known to retained earnings.   
{Insert Table 7 here} 
4.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
We conduct supplementary tests to provide additional support for our results. 
First, we exclude sixteen financial firms from our sample and repeat our analyses. 
Financial firms are subject to specific regulation that may influence their accounting 
choices. Furthermore, their leverage ratio is likely to differ from that of industrial firms. 
Results (untabulated) are not affected by the exclusion of financial firms. Second, we add 
controls for growth (Tobin’s Q) and industry and repeat our analyses. Results 
(untabulated) remain unchanged. Finally, we repeat our valuation analysis by running 
separate regressions for each optional exemption. Results (untabulated) are not affected. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether and how managerial incentives influence the 
decision to elect optional exemptions when first adopting International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). It also examines the value-relevance of the mandatory and 
optional equity adjustments that need to be recognized in connection with the first-time 
adoption of IFRS. Both questions are addressed in the context of the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS by French firms in 2005. Three major findings emerge from our analyses. First, 
managerial incentives influence the decision to strategically elect one or more optional 
exemption choices at the transition date. Second, mandatory equity adjustments are more 
valued than French GAAP equity, suggesting that the first-time adoption of IFRS by 
French firms is perceived as a signal of an increase in the quality of the financial 
statements. Third, the value-relevance of optional IFRS equity adjustments depends on 
whether they result in the disclosure of new information regarding capital assets, 
employee benefits, cumulative translation differences, financial assets, and business 
combinations.  
We contribute to the literature on the determinants of mandatory accounting changes 
by studying factors affecting the decision to simultaneously elect up to five optional 
exemptions when first adopting a new set of GAAP, IFRS, rather than focusing on 
individual changes within a specific set of accounting standards. We contribute to the 
literature related to the determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption by examining 
the causes and consequences of the individual exemption choices made at the transition 
date, rather than considering the adoption per se as the choice. Finally, we contribute to 
the literature on the valuation effects of mandatory IFRS adoption by investigating the 
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value relevance of equity adjustments at transition date rather than focusing on the value 
relevance of earnings and equity as reported in the first IFRS financial statements. We 
also distinguish between mandatory and optional equity adjustments.  
Our results must be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. First, the power 
of our empirical analyses is limited because of the small size of our sample. Second, our 
analysis is restricted to French firms and does not include firms from other European 
countries. Third, our analysis of the determinants of the optional exemption choices is 
based on the observed portfolio of choices made by French firms. Overall, this could 
reduce the external validity of our results and create a self selection bias. In addition, the 
exclusion of delisted companies could introduce a survival bias. Finally, pricing 
mechanisms and the information environment differ across firms and countries. Value 
relevance studies using stock price as a parsimonious measure to capture all public 
information in the market, such as ours, may suffer from a correlated omitted variable 
problem because stock prices may incorporate information in a different manner across 
firms (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007).  
Future research may be needed to compare how the managerial incentives that 
influence the decision to elect optional exemptions differ across countries that 
mandatorily adopt IFRS. It would also be interesting to investigate whether the value-
relevance of mandatory and optional equity adjustments is influenced by country-specific 
factors.   
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Table 1 
Optional Exemptions 
 
 Optional Exemption  
Fair Value or 
Revaluation as Deemed 
Cost 
Choice to measure individual items of property, plant and 
equipment at fair value at the date of transition to IFRS 
and to use that fair value as its deemed cost at that date. 
First-time adopters that choose to use the exemption do not 
have to use the revaluation model in future periods.  
 
Employee Benefits  Choice to calculate the net pension obligation at the 
transition date without consideration of the corridor 
approach. First-time adopters can eliminate unrecognized 
actuarial gains and losses by charging them to equity in the 
opening IFRS balance sheet.  
 
Cumulative 
Translation 
Differences  
Choice not to calculate the cumulative translation 
difference retrospectively and to set the cumulative 
translation difference calculated in accordance with 
previous GAAP to zero. Only translation differences that 
arose after the date of transition to IFRS are recognized in 
future net income if the foreign operation is subsequently 
disposed of. 
 
Designation of 
Previously Recognized 
Financial Instruments 
Choice to designate previously recognized financial assets 
as “as at fair value through profit or loss” or as “available-
for-sale” at the transition date. 
 
Business Combinations Choice not to account for a business combination prior to 
the transition date in accordance with IFRS 3. First-time 
adopters that elect to account for past business 
combinations in accordance with IFRS 1 do not have to 
reclassify them (i.e. pooling of interests method can be 
maintained); they do not have to remeasure original fair 
values determined at the time of the business combination; 
and they do not have to adjust the carrying amount of 
goodwill recognized under previous GAAP. 
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Table 2 
Sample Selection(1) 
 
 
French firms included in the SBF 120 at December 31, 2005 120 
(-) firms reporting in US GAAP (3) 
(-) foreign firms already reporting in IFRS before 2005 because they 
were not subject to French GAAP 
(3) 
(-) firms that were delisted (7) 
First-time adopters of IFRS for 2005 financial statements listed on 
the SBF 120 
107 
(-) firms with incomplete financial data (1) 
Final sample 106 
 
(1) This table summarizes the sample selection procedure. 
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Table 3 
Classification Procedure(1) 
 
 
Negative Impact on Equity (n = 42) 
 
Other (n = 64) 
Employee benefits only 4 Fair value or revaluation as 
deemed cost  
8 
Cumulative translation 
differences only 
10 Designation of previously 
recognized financial 
instruments  
36 
Both 28 Retrospective application of 
IFRS 3  
2 
  Fair value or revaluation as 
deemed cost and designation 
of previously recognized 
financial instruments 
13 
  Designation of previously 
recognized financial 
instruments and retrospective 
application of IFRS 3 
5 
Total 42 Total 64 
 
(1) This table summarizes the classification procedure used to code the dependent variable. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics(1) 
 
Variable (2) Negative 
(N: 42) 
Other  
(N: 64) 
Both 
(N: 106) 
Test of differences  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Means 
P >│t│ 
Medians 
P >│Χ│ 
MANDADJUST 0.79 1 0.66 1 0.71 1 0.077 0.256 
TRADEOFF 0.40 0 0.20 0 0.28 0 0.012 0.020 
LEVERAGE 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.021 0.112 
FLIST 0.07 0 0.32 0 0.21 0 0.002 0.003 
SIZE 23.19 22.85 22.37 22.49 22.66 22.53 0.025 0.233 
PRICE 92.63 64.35 54.42 42.79 69.69 45.83 0.040 0.017 
ADJBV 39.80 22.61 15.63 13.43 24.73 16.06 0.006 0.011 
RESEPS 1.70 0.94 0.68 0.74 1.08 0.62 0.050 0.112 
MANDIFRS 6.93 0.84 3.95 0.35 5.05 0.61 0.248 0.254 
REVAL 0.00 0 0.42 0 0.26 0 0.056 0.018 
EBEN -1.50 -0.22 -0.92 -0.09 -1.14 -0.11 0.184 0.682 
TRANSDIFF -1.76 0 -0.43 0 -0.96 0 0.014 0.362 
FININSTR 0.00 0 0.21 0 0.13 0 0.173 0.002 
BUSCOMREM 0.00 0 0.39 0 0.23 0 0.480 0.061 
TOTAL 
OPTIONAL 
EXEMPTIONS 
-3.39 -1.05 -0.12 -0.12 -1.36 -0.42 0.003 0.017 
 
(1) This table presents mean and median values for the variables included in the regression models. Sample firms are 
divided among those that elect for optional exemptions with a negative impact on equity at transition date (N= 42) and 
others (N = 64). Tests of differences in means and medians are used to compare the two groups. Mean and median 
values are also reported for the full sample (N = 106).  
(2) Variable definitions: 
MANDADJUST = 1 if the sum of the mandatory equity adjustments at transition date is positive; 0 
otherwise 
TRADEOFF = 1 if the firm’s equity before optional exemptions and earnings multiple are 
higher than the sample median; 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE = Long-term debt under French GAAP at the end of 2004 divided by total assets 
under French GAAP at the end of 2004 
FLIST = 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a non-European stock exchange; 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of lagged total assets 
PRICE = Closing share price three months after the end of the adoption year 
ADJBV = Book value per share minus the cumulative effect of the mandatory and 
optional IFRS adjustments per share  
RESEPS = Residual earnings per share for the adoption year 
MANDIFRS = Cumulative effect of the mandatory IFRS adjustments per share 
REVAL = Effect of revaluation as deemed cost exemption per share  
EBEN = Effect of employee benefits exemption per share 
TRANSDIFF = Effect of cumulative translation difference exemption per share 
BUSCOMREM = Effect of retrospective application of IFRS 3 per share 
FININSTR = Effect of designation of previously recognized financial instruments exemption 
per share 
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Table 5 
Correlations(1) 
 
Panel A – Determinants of Optional Exemptions 
 
Variable(2) (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) OPTEXEMP 1.000 0.139 0.219* -0.203* -0.286* 0.191 
(2) MANDADJUST  1.000 -0.001 0.048 0.021 -0.060 
(3) TRADEOFF   1.000 0.129 -0.083 0.072 
(4) LEVERAGE    1.000 0.058 0.073 
(5) FLIST     1.000 0.336* 
(6) SIZE      1.000 
 
Panel B – Valuation of IFRS Adjustments 
 
Variable(2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) PRICE 1.000 0.123 0.107 0.011 0.055 -0.181 0.006 0.021 0.213* 
(2) ADJBV  1.000 -0.544* -0.095 -0.245* -0.264* -0.163 -0.025 0.096 
(3) MANDIFRS   1.000 *0.235 -0.132 -0.230* 0.555* -0.168 0.177 
(4) REVAL    1.000 0.026 0.092 0.472* -0.032 0.015 
(5) EBEN     1.000 0.067 0.028 0.041 -0.016 
(6) TRANSDIFF      1.000 0.065 0.038 0.053 
(7) FININSTR       1.000 -0.016 0.027 
(8) BUSCOMREM        1.000 -0.033 
(9) RESEPS         1.000 
 
(1) This table presents pairwise correlations between variables included in the regression models. * denotes 
significance at the 5% level. 
(2) Variable definitions: 
OPTEXEMP = 1 if the firm elects to only use the optional exemptions with a negative impact on equity 
at transition date; 0 otherwise 
MANDADJUST = 1 if the sum of the mandatory equity adjustments at transition date is positive; 0 
otherwise 
TRADEOFF = 1 if the firm’s equity before optional exemptions and earnings multiple are higher than 
the sample median; 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE = Long-term debt under French GAAP at the end of 2004 divided by total assets under 
French GAAP at the end of 2004 
FLIST = 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a non-European stock exchange; 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of lagged total assets 
PRICE = Closing share price three months after the end of the adoption year 
ADJBV = Book value per share minus the cumulative effect of the mandatory and optional IFRS 
adjustments per share  
RESEPS = Residual earnings per share for the adoption year 
MANDIFRS = Cumulative effect of the mandatory IFRS adjustments per share 
REVAL = Effect of revaluation as deemed cost exemption per share  
EBEN = Effect of employee benefits exemption per share 
TRANSDIFF = Effect of cumulative translation difference exemption per share 
BUSCOMREM = Effect of retrospective application of IFRS 3 per share 
FININSTR = Effect of designation of previously recognized financial instruments exemption per share 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Optional Exemptions(1) 
 
Variable(2) Predicted Sign Coefficient 
MANDADJUST + 0.782** 
TRADEOFF + 0.701*** 
LEVERAGE - -3.581*** 
FLIST ? -1.932*** 
SIZE ? 0.315*** 
Wald Chi2  
(p-value) 
 28.07  
(0.000) 
Pseudo R2  26.8% 
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. One-tailed if directional prediction, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
(1) This table presents the results of the binary probit regression examining the determinants of French 
firms’ decision to use one or more optional exemptions when first adopting IFRS. Parameter estimates are 
based on the following model: OPTEXEMPi = β0 + β1MANDADJUSTi + β2TRADEOFFi + β3LEVERAGEi 
+ β4FLISTi + β5SIZEi + εi  
(2) Variable definitions: 
OPTEXEMP = 1 if the firm elects to only use the optional exemptions with a negative 
impact on equity at transition date; 0 otherwise 
MANDADJUST = 1 if the sum of the mandatory equity adjustments at transition date is 
positive; 0 otherwise 
TRADEOFF = 1 if the firm’s equity before optional exemptions and earnings multiple are 
higher than the sample median; 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE = Long-term debt under French GAAP at the end of 2004 divided by total 
assets under French GAAP at the end of 2004 
FLIST = 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a non-European stock exchange; 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of lagged total assets 
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Table 7 
Valuation of IFRS Adjustments(1) 
 
Variable(2) Predicted Sign Coefficient 
INEQUITY + 7.236*** 
ADJBV + 1.587*** 
MANDIFRS + 1.745*** 
REVAL + 1.575* 
EBEN + 2.244*** 
TRANSDIFF - -1.422 
FININSTR + -23.761 
BUSCOMREM + 2.731*** 
RESEPS + 11.092*** 
F statistic  
(p-value) 
 19.37  
(0.000) 
R2  47.8% 
Test of equality of coefficients (β2 =  β3) 
F statistic 
(p-value) 
  
0.95 
(0.330) 
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. One-tailed if directional prediction, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
(1) This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression model examining the value-
relevance of IFRS adjustments for French firms that first adopt IFRS. Parameter estimates are based on the 
following model: MTBi = β0 + β1INEQUITYi + β2ADJBVi + β3MANDIFRSi + β4REVALi + β5EBENi + 
β6TRANSDIFFi + β7FININSTRi + β8BUSCOMREMi + β9RESEPSi + εi     
(2) Variable definitions: 
MTB = Closing share price three months after the end of the adoption year divided 
by book value of equity per share at the end of t-1  
INEQUITY = 1 / book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
ADJBV = Book value per share minus the cumulative effect of the mandatory and 
optional IFRS adjustments per share divided by book value of equity per 
share at the end of t-1 
MANDIFRS = Cumulative effect of the mandatory IFRS adjustments per share divided by 
book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
REVAL = Effect of revaluation as deemed cost exemption per share divided by book 
value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
EBEN = Effect of employee benefits exemption per share divided by book value of 
equity per share at the end of t-1 
TRANSDIFF = Effect of cumulative translation difference exemption per share divided by 
book value of equity per share at the end of t-1 
FININSTR = Effect of designation of previously recognized financial instruments 
exemption per share divided by book value of equity per share at the end of 
t-1 
BUSCOMREM = Effect of retrospective application of IFRS 3 per share divided by book value 
of equity per share at the end of t-1 
RESEPS = Residual earnings per share for the adoption year divided by book value of 
equity per share at the end of t-1 
 
